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Research Article

The Effect of Reward and Punishment on the Turnover Intention of Maharagung Organizer Crew

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Abstract: This research looks at why freelance event crews think about leaving Maharagung Organizer by focusing on two things: the rewards they receive and the punishments they face in a project-based setup. The core issue is that crews feel dissatisfied when rewards are unclear or rarely given, while discipline rules can feel uneven, so the goal is to see whether these practices actually change how much people want to quit. The study uses a simple survey design and analyzes the results with a PLS model in SmartPLS after checking that the questions reliably measure reward, punishment, and turnover intention, and it includes everyone active and reachable during the data phase. The results point one way: fair, transparent rewards help people want to stay, while discipline does more to set standards than to keep people from leaving; taken together, that means rewards carry most of the weight for retention, and punishments mostly support order and safety. The bottom line for managers is to make rewards predictable, tied to performance, and clearly communicated, then keep discipline fair and consistent in the background so crews feel respected and choose to keep taking future event offers.

Keywords: Maharagung Organize, Punishment, Reward, SmartPLS, Turnover Intention

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1. Introduction

In the era of globalization and intensifying competition, Human Resources (HR) functions as a strategic asset that determines organizational success through productivity, efficiency, and sustained commitment to shared goals (Mangkunegara & Prabu, 2015). Effective HR management aligns reward, discipline, capability development, and work systems so organizational strategy and people practices move in concert to achieve targeted performance outcomes.

Turnover intention employees deliberate consideration to leave the organization has emerged as a critical HR challenge because it disrupts continuity, raises recruitment and training costs, and erodes tacit knowledge essential for performance (Fitriani, 2020; Ihwanti & Gunawan, 2023; Arrasyid & Asj'ari, 2020; Syazwani & Zafirna, 2024). Prior studies note that high turnover intention predicts actual exits and is shaped by multiple organizational and individual factors, including compensation systems, career pathways, culture, relationships, and perceived justice (Anggraini & Swasti, 2024; Iskandar & Rahadi, 2021). Within this lens, reward and punishment are salient levers because they signal fairness, recognition, and boundaries that shape motivation and attachment to the organization

Reward is a strategic lever because it signals fairness and recognition that shape motivation and attachment to the organization. Fair and transparent rewards covering salary, bonuses, and promotion consistently strengthen affective commitment and lower employees' intention to leave (Putri et al., 2024; Suparmi & Septiawan, 2019; Suriyanti & Ardianto, 2023).

This phenomenon is evident at Maharagung Organizer, a leading event organizer in Surabaya and East Java that relies on freelance crews engaged per event without permanent contracts, creating high mobility and a fluid labor structure. Company data show pronounced fluctuations in labor turnover and a marked decline in the number of crews receiving rewards over recent years, alongside variations in disciplinary cases dominated by light sanctions, indicating misalignment between recognition practices and compliance mechanisms in a project-based context. These dynamics suggest a persistent problem of retention under flexible employment, where the credibility and clarity of rewards may matter more for staying decisions than the frequency of sanctions applied. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the influence of reward and punishment on the turnover intention of freelance crews at Maharagung Organizer, providing evidence to guide policies on transparent reward portfolios and proportionate, consistent discipline that foster a fair environment and encourage crews to continue collaborating across events.

2. Preliminaries or Related Work or Literature Review

Reward

Reward is defined as a form of recognition given to employees who demonstrate outstanding performance, such as bonuses, promotions, or increased authority (Rivai, 2018). (Arrasyid & Asj'ari, 2020) explain that reward functions as compensation for individuals who have contributed to achieving organizational goals. A fair and transparent reward system can enhance affective commitment reflected in employees' desire to remain long-term and maintain organizational reputation (Chandra et al., 2024). Indicators of reward include salary, promotion, recognition, incentives, benefits, and wages (Putri et al., 2024).

Punishment

Punishment is defined as consequences given to employees who consciously violate rules to prevent losses to the organization (Arrasyid & Asj'ari, 2020). (Suriyanti & Ardianto, 2023) state that punishment can be used by leaders as a communication tool to encourage employee behavior change. The application of punishment is intended for employees who commit violations or do not demonstrate expected behavior, aiming to improve and maintain discipline in the workplace (Suparmi & Septiawan, 2019). According to Rivai cited by (Putri et al., 2024), punishment can be categorized into light punishment (verbal or written warnings), moderate (postponement of salary increases or promotions), and severe (termination).

Turnover Intention

Turnover intention is the desire or intention of employees to terminate their employment relationship with the organization where they work, triggered by various factors such as searching for better career opportunities or positions (Fitriani, 2020). (Gyanmar & Achmad, 2024) explain that this refers to employees' intention to release themselves from their current job positions and switch to seeking opportunities in other work environments that offer more optimal prospects. High turnover intention can cause significant negative impacts on organizations, including financial burdens for recruitment and training processes, as well as the loss of intellectual assets in the form of knowledge and experience possessed by departing employees (Arrasyid & Asj'ari, 2020; Syazwani & Zafirna, 2024; Lestari, 2019).

Research Framework and Hypothesis

Based on theories proposed by experts and previous research, the conceptual framework in this study illustrates the influence of reward and punishment on employee turnover intention in a freelance work context.




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework.

A hypothesis is a temporary answer to the research problem formulation based on empirical facts obtained through data collection (Sugiyono, 2016). The hypotheses used in this study are as follows:

H1: Reward has a significant negative effect on the turnover intention of Maharagung Organizer freelance crews.

H2: Punishment has a significant negative effect on the turnover intention of Maharagung Organizer freelance crews.

3. Method

This research employs a quantitative approach with a survey method to test the proposed hypotheses (Sugiyono, 2016). The study population comprises all active freelance crews of Maharagung Organizer engaged on a per-event basis in Surabaya and East Java. The sampling technique used is saturated sampling, including every available active crew at the time of data collection to capture the full variation of the project-based workforce. The research instrument is a closed-ended questionnaire using a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, covering three latent variables operationalized from the thesis instrument:

- 1. Reward (X1): salary/wage, bonuses/incentives, and promotion/recognition indicators
- 2. Punishment (X2): light sanctions (verbal/written warnings), moderate sanctions (postponed raises/promotions), and severe sanctions (termination) as appropriate to organizational policy
- 3. Turnover Intention (Y): items reflecting the desire to search for other jobs, consider resignation, and intentions to leave the organization.

Data analysis uses Structural Equation Modeling based on Partial Least Squares (PLS-SEM) implemented with SmartPLS software due to its suitability for prediction-oriented models, complex relationships, and less stringent distributional assumptions. The measurement model is assessed through convergent validity and reliability by examining outer loadings and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each construct, alongside internal consistency with Cronbach's alpha and Composite Reliability; discriminant validity is reviewed using cross-loadings and latent construct correlations prior to structural testing (Purwanto et al., 2020). The structural model evaluation includes coefficient of determination for endogenous variables and path coefficients significance via bootstrapping to test the hypotheses regarding the effects of reward and punishment on turnover intention in the freelance crew context.

4. Results and Discussion

Outer Model




Figure 2. Outer Model (Factor Loading, Path Coefficient, and R-Square).

Figure "Outer Model" displays factor loadings above each arrow from a construct to its indicator, path coefficients on the arrows between exogenous and endogenous constructs, and the R-square value inside the endogenous construct circle for Turnover Intention. These values inform measurement quality and the strength of structural relations prior to hypothesis testing.

Convergent Validity

Table 1. Outer Loading

	Reward	Punishment	Turnover Intention
	(X1)	(X2)	(Y)
X1.1	0.932		
X1.2	0.908		
X1.3	0.923		
X2.1		0.921	
X2.2		0.922	
X2.3		0.938	
Y 1			0.931
Y2			0.926
Y3			0.904

Source: Data processed by the researcher (2025)

Based on Table 1, the loading factor shows the strength of the relationship between each indicator and its construct. The data processing results show that all indicators have a loading factor value greater than 0.70 (loading factor > 0.70), which means the indicators are declared valid and meet the specified criteria.

Table 2. Average Variance Extracted (AVE).

	AVE (Average Extracted
Reward	0.848
Punishment	0.859
Turnover intention	0.847

Source: Data processed by the researcher (2025)

Based on Table 2, the data processing results show that all AVE values are > 0.50, which means the measurement has met the convergent validity criterion.

Discriminant Validity

Table 3. Cross Loading.

	Reward Punishme		Turnover intention
	(X1)		(Y)
X1.1	0.932	0.885	-0.922

X1.2	0.908	0.800	-0.863
X1.3	0.923	0.833	0.870
X2.1	0.799	0.921	-0.843
X2.2	0.823	0.922	-0.809
X2.3	0.911	0.938	-0.871
Y 1	-0.874	-0.816	0.931
Y2	-0.897	-0.865	0.926
Y3	-0.884	-0.824	0.904

Source: Data processed by the researcher (2025)

Based on the cross loading data processing results in Table 3, it is found that all loading factor values for each indicator (highlighted) on the Reward (X1), Punishment (X2), and Turnover Intention (Y) variables show a higher loading factor value compared to the loading factor values of the indicators from other variables.

Reliability

Table 4. Cronbach's Alpha and Composite Reliability.

	Cronbach's	Composite
	Alpha	Reliability
Reward	0.944	0.911
Punishment	0.948	0.918
Turnover intention	0.943	0.909

Source: Data processed by the researcher (2025)

Based on Table 4, all constructs have a Cronbach's alpha and Composite Reliability value greater than 0.70 (Cronbach's alpha / Composite Reliability > 0.70), which means all instruments have good reliability in measuring the construct. Thus, the respondents' answers are declared consistent, and the research questionnaire can be considered reliable.

Inner Model

R-Square

Testing the structural model is done by looking at the R-Square value, which is a goodness-of-fit model test. The inner model testing can be seen based on the R-Square value in the equation between latent variables. The R² value explains how much the exogenous variables (independent/free) in the model are able to explain the endogenous variable (dependent/bound).

Table 5. R-Square

	R-Square	
Turnover intention	0.931	

Source: Data processed by the researcher (2025)

Based on Table 5, the R-Square value of 0.931 can be interpreted as the model being able to explain the phenomenon of turnover intention, which is influenced by independent variables including reward and punishment, with a variance of 93.1%. The remaining 6,9% is explained by other variables outside the study (besides reward and punishment).

Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis testing can be seen through the coefficient results and T-statistic value of the inner model in the following table:

Table 6. Path Coefficient (Mean, STDEV, T-Values).

Path	Sample	Standart	T	P Values
Coefficien	Mean	Deviation	Statistic	
(O)	(M)	(STDEV)	otatione	

Reward -> Turnover	-0.796	-0.695	0.221	0.801	0.000
intention					
Punishment ->	-0.182	-0.281	0.227	3.602	0.423
Turnover intention					

Source: Data processed by the researcher (2025)

Based on Table 4.13 above, a hypothesis conclusion can be drawn stating:

- 1. Hypothesis 1: Reward on Turnover Intention is negative and significant, as indicated by a p-value of 0.000, which is below the 0.05 threshold; therefore, the hypothesis is accepted. The path coefficient of -0.796 means that higher Reward is associated with a lower tendency toward Turnover Intention, and the SmartPLS p-value of 0.000 indicates an extremely small probability even when rounded to three decimals.
- 2. **Hypothesis 2:** The effect of Punishment on Turnover Intention is negative but not significant, because the p-value of 0.423 exceeds the 0.05 threshold; therefore, the hypothesis cannot be accepted. The path coefficient of -0.182 shows a decreasing relationship, but it is not statistically strong enough according to the PLS-SEM bootstrap test.

The significance of the T-Statistic result can also be seen from the SmartPLS output with bootstrapping in the image below:




Figure 3. Output Bootstrapping.

Discussion

Influence of Reward on Turnover Intention

The results of this study indicate that reward has a negative effect on turnover intention; the better the rewards provided, the lower the crew's intention to leave their jobs. This finding shows that rewards play an important role in retaining crew, where improvements in the quality or intensity of rewards are inversely related to the company's turnover intention. In other words, rewards that are perceived as fair and consistent can serve as a primary deterrent for crew members who are considering leaving.

In operational roles such as Event Organizer crews, a transparent reward system and formal recognition clarify the link between the effort expended and the compensation received. At Maharagung, the reward system and fee (wage) payments are designed in tiers based on crew grades. Each crew member is categorized into a specific grade according to their length of service and the number of events they take. This grading system is the main basis for determining the fee each crew member will receive. Such a system motivates crews to continuously improve their competencies so they can move up to higher grades with larger fees.

Fees/wages are a crucial factor that strongly influences crews' decisions to remain with the organization. This is closely related to their status as freelancers who are not bound by a permanent contract with Maharagung. Maharagung crews work on an event-based or project basis. When an event arises, Maharagung offers the crew the opportunity to join, and they are completely free to accept or decline the offer according to their availability and schedules.

This flexible work model allows crews to manage their own time, but it also means they do not have guaranteed monthly income.

Crews' decisions to accept subsequent event offers are influenced by several factors, with most crews considering their free time and the amount of the fee offered. The fee must be competitive and commensurate with the workload, responsibilities, and duration of the event. If the pay offered is considered unattractive, they will choose to decline. A clear and transparent grading system also provides crews with hope for progression. When crews see the opportunity to move up to a higher grade with greater compensation, they are motivated to keep demonstrating their best performance by accepting event offers from Maharagung.

This is consistent with the study by (Nabila et al., 2023) at PT Karya Dayun, which found that rewards have a negative and significant effect on turnover intention among the company's crews. The findings emphasize that improvements in the quality of rewards when perceived as fair and consistent are associated with reduced intentions to quit in the population studied. In the context of PT Karya Dayun, crews who perceive the reward system as clear and aligned with their contributions tend to maintain loyalty and resist the urge to seek job opportunities outside the organization.

Influence of Punishment on Turnover Intention

The result indicate that the second hypothesis is rejected because the results show that punishment does not affect turnover intention. Although the application of sanctions tends to decrease crews' intention to leave, the hypothesis about a negative effect of punishment on turnover intention was built on the assumption that sanctions would lower crews' desire to quit an event organizer. This assumption rested on the idea that stricter punishment fosters discipline, makes work more orderly, and minimizes violations that could harm both the company and the crews themselves. Clear tasks and certainty about sanctions should make crews who intend to work seriously feel comfortable, thereby reducing the turnover intention of Maharagung crews. However, the tests did not find any effect of punishment on turnover intention. This shows that turnover intention is not influenced by how high or low the level of punishment received by the crews is.

In operational roles such as event organizer crews, consistent punishment can, in principle, provide behavioral boundaries and create discipline. In practice, however, crews tend to respond more strongly to the reward system than to sanctions. The non-significant effect of punishment suggests that crews are not substantially influenced by the company's punitive system when deciding whether to remain, because Maharagung crews are not bound by formal contracts; as a result, they are more responsive to rewards than to the sanctions applied.

These results are consistent with (Zafar et al., 2022), who found that punishment (punitive supervision) did not affect turnover intention, and with (Ali et al., 2022), who reported that a form of punishment abusive supervision had no significant direct effect on turnover intention. Conversely, the results contrast with (Arrasyid & Asj'ari, 2020) at CV. Cahaya Motor, where punishment was reported to have a negative effect on turnover intention in that company's context. Their findings underscore the role of fair and consistent enforcement as behavioral guardrails that can dampen the impulse to look for alternative jobs. Punishment was positioned as a control mechanism that clarifies behavioral limits and the consequences of violations, encouraging compliance and restraining the intention to quit when rules are enforced transparently and proportionately. In other words, a sound punitive system can help create a conducive work environment in which crews feel comfortable because of certainty in how activities are carried out. However, the present study differs because punishment did not succeed in influencing turnover intention.

The divergence in results can be traced to fundamental differences in industry characteristics and the nature of work. Maharagung's EO crews operate in a project/event-based environment that is temporary and flexible, whereas CV. Cahaya Motor (a motorcycle dealer) has a stable structure and routine operations. In the EO context, the decision to leave is more strongly shaped by external factors such as per-event fees, alternative project opportunities, and uncertain workloads, rendering punishment less relevant in shaping turnover intention.

Based on prior studies, the effect of punishment and its various forms is not always directly related to turnover intention. In some organizational conditions, other factors or variables participate in shaping turnover intention. The same applies to Maharagung crews:

there is likely a set of additional factors not examined in this study that influence, or even moderate, the relationship between punishment and turnover intention.

5. Conclusion

Based on data analysis using the SEM-PLS method conducted on 59 Maharagung EO crew members to examine how reward and punishment influence their intention to leave the company, this study produces several key findings as follows.

- 1. Reward is shown to play a role in reducing turnover intention. Crew members who receive commensurate pay as the most prominent aspect of reward tend to show a decrease in their desire to leave the company. This finding indicates that increasing salary as part of the reward system can lower the level of turnover intention.
- 2. Punishment is not shown to play a role in reducing turnover intention. Crew members who face the threat of termination where termination is the most prominent aspect of punishment—do not consistently show a decrease in their desire to leave. This finding indicates that tightening termination policies does not lower turnover intention under the observed conditions.

As an implication of this study, the following recommendations are formulated based on the finding that the highest indicator within the reward variable is salary and the highest indicator within the punishment variable is termination, with punishment having no significant effect on turnover intention.

- 1. Based on the results, the strongest influence within the reward variable lies in the salary indicator. The company is advised to review and manage compensation policies more effectively, transparently, and proportionally to workload, and to ensure payment accuracy and consistency. The company can also evaluate workload, adjust wages, and provide clear recognition so that crew members feel fairly treated and secure at work. By strengthening a proportional and consistent reward system, the crew's turnover intention is expected to decrease in line with the relationship observed in this study.
- 2. Based on the results, the strongest indicator within the punishment variable is termination; however, punishment does not have a significant effect on turnover intention. The company is therefore advised not to rely on stricter termination policies as the main strategy to reduce turnover intention, but to prioritize strengthening rewards while ensuring that disciplinary policies remain clear and proportional through mechanisms such as verbal warnings, promotion delays, and termination only as a last resort. By focusing on improving rewards and applying reasonable and consistent discipline, crew members' decisions to stay are expected to be driven more by perceived fairness and certainty of compensation than by the threat of sanctions.

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